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A Constitutional Right to Health Care: An
Unlikely Development

Sarah C. Carey*

Through a growing range of statutory enactments, the states, aided by
the federal government, have increasingly assumed the obligation of providing or supporting health services and health facilities either directly, through
local government units, or through private entities. This undertaking is defined by a series of laws that are often poorly coordinated in an erratic manner. Nonetheless, taken together, these laws constitute a legislative "system"
of health care.
This paper examines the totality of statutory and constitutional provisions
guiding the delivery of hospital services in three states: California, Michigan
and New Jersey,' to determine if legal grounds exist for compelling delivery
of the promised services in a more equitable manner that will insure the
availability of the same levels of services to poor patients as are provided to
the non-poor.
The primary focus of the analysis is on the question of whether the equal
protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides the basis for a challenge to the state system of hospital
care, alleging discriminatory allocation of resources. The analysis concludes
that there are ample grounds for a judicial finding that hospital facilities,
whether private or public, are part of the state "system" and therefore sufficiently imbued with state action to bring them within the reach of the equal
protection guarantee. However, the inequities perpetrated under the state
system probably do not constitute unlawful discrimination.
The two tests developed by the Supreme Court for determining whether
* B.A. 1960, Radcliffe; J.D. 1965, Georgetown Law Center; Partner with Gore,
Cladouhos & Brashares, formerly Assistant Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law.
1. These states were selected because of the breadth of their hospital regulatory
schemes.
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state discrimination is unlawful are (1) whether it interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or interest or creates a suspect classification or
(2) whether it lacks a rational basis for effecting the statutory purpose. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court in regard to housing, welfare and the financing of public schools make it clear that inequitable hospital services do
not meet the first test. As far as the second test is concerned, the Court has
shown a willingness to apply careful scrutiny to state statutes, and has recently expanded the reach of the rational basis test, but it does not appear
prepared to extend the test beyond individual abuses to encompass systemic
discrimination.
In short, present interpretations of the equal protection clause strongly suggest that it does not provide a viable basis for a system-wide challenge to inequities in the delivery of hospital care. 2 Such a basis may, however, exist
in state constitutional and statutory provisions that seek to effect a goal of universal health care. This paper concludes with a suggested strategy for developing such state challenges, borrowing heavily from experience in the school
finance reform litigation movement. The effort to redistribute public school
resources through judicial action-has, provided invaluable lessons concerning the limitations of constitutional litigation and the problems of defining
sound legal precedent in an area where there has been relatively little previous court action.
Background
The issues here are framed solely in terms of the delivery of in-patient hospital care, but the principles applied are of general applicability to other
modes of health care delivery including clinics and health maintenance programs.
State constitutions and laws impose varying obligations on governmental
units to: (a) protect the general health and safety of the people; (b) provide
health care for all the people or for indigent people; or (c) to otherwise meet
health and physical needs. This undertaking is met by: (1) the provision
of public hospitals and other publicly supported services including clinics, immunization programs, etc. (in some rural and suburban areas such resources
are lacking; and (2) by reliance on the availability of private nonprofit
hospitals and clinics. The latter reliance may be achieved through public
2. This paper does not deal with individual challenges by patients of doctors seeking access to private hospitals imbued with state action. Such challenges have, in the
past, been successfully based on suspect classifications and irrational regulations under
the equal protection clause and on unfairness under the due process clause. Recent
decisions suggest that such challenges are likely to be expanded in dealing with individual discriminatory situations in the future. However, they do not reach systemic problems of resource denial.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 23:492

health insurance; the payment of public grants or subsidies to private hospitals (like D.C.'s program for the medically indigent or reimbursement provisions in affiliation contracts); public planning or regulation of hospital resources pursuant to comprehensive health planning programs; certificate-ofneed legislation; and through less systemic controls such as state programs
to issue bonds to support private hospital construction (the grant or denial of
a bond issuance operates as a control on the number of new facilities to be
constructed).3
These arrangements have evolved without a conscious recognition that the
network of state laws dealing with hospitals in effect constitutes an undertaking to provide a unitary, if heterogeneous, system of hospital care. If the
courts can be persuaded to view the laws in this manner, then the private
hospitals that constitute a substantial segment of the "system" will assume
quasi-public status and will be legally obligated to meet federal constitutional
standards of due process and equal protection in the delivery of services.
Two basic factual assumptions are made here. First, in the urban areas
of each of the three states there exists a "two-track" system of delivering
health care, while in some rural areas there are no hospital facilities available at all within reasonable traveling distances. 4 Under the "two-track"
system, paying patients tend to receive higher quality services from private
proprietary or nonprofit hospitals, while non-paying poorer patients are relegated to the public hospitals that are generally characterized by overcrowding, underfunding, and lower quality of services. Secondly, there exists a large
and definable group of "medically indigent" persons who either receive no
hospital services or are confined to inferior services. Persons falling within
this group are those whose income falls below the federally defined poverty
level but who are ineligible for assistance under the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. 5 (E.g., the non-elderly indigent without children is ineligible for
Medicaid assistance in many states). This group also includes the "medi3. There is little or no case law defining the limits and proper application of many
of the state laws relied upon here. Some of them are too new to have been subjected
to legal challenges and others have not been given content because of the relatively
low level of consumer interest in legal challenges to health services, except in the
case of malpractice.
4. For a grim description of just such an instance, see the factual situation in Stanturf v. Sipes, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964), where the plaintiff, who had frostbite, lost
both his feet after a private rural Missouri hospital refused him admission for inability
to pay. Plaintiff's assertion of a private right of action under the Hill-Burton Act,
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) was denied. The fact that a state court subsequently
granted him a right of action was small consolation for the damage suffered and at best
an imperfect individualized solution to a general problem. See also Stanturf v. Sipes,
447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
5. Guidelines established by the federal government define those in poverty as a
non-farm family of four whose income is less than $4,000.
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cally needy," those whose income falls below the poverty line only after annual medical expenses are subtracted. Under the Federal Medicaid Act, assistance to the medically needy is optional with the participating state. Of
the three states examined here, CaliforniaO and Michigan 7 provide some assistance to this group; New Jersey does not.8
The Legal Background
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution is the major basis for any legal challenge seeking to invalidate a state system for allocating hospital resources on the grounds that it
discriminates against the poor-or any other group. The two major prerequisites to the success of such litigation are (1) a finding that the state is so
involved in the regulation or operation of such hospitals as to render their
actions "state action," and (2) a finding that through their actions, such
hospitals have discriminated against certain citizens in a manner that violates equal protection standards.
A.

Defining State Action

The equal protection clause provides that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It does not proscribe
such activity by private persons. But, over the years, the federal courts
have evolved several principles by which they have held private enterprises
to be so involved with the state as to bring them within the ambit of the equal
protection clause.
The earliest of these principles originated in the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the so-called "white primary cases," Smith v. Allright,9 and
Terry v. Adams.10 In these two decisions, the court held that black voters
could not be excluded from participation in either primary or pre-primary
elections which were conducted by private associations pursuant to the legislative direction of the Texas legislature. The Court held that the Democratic
Party, which conducted these elections, was cloaked with state action, despite its nominal and, for virtually all other purposes, legal status as a private
association. The essence of the reasoning behind these two decisions was
6.

CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1250 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
7. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 16.490(16) (Cumulative Supp. 1968).
8. An attempt to have assistance to the medically needy declared compulsory under
either the federal statute or the United States Constitution was recently rejected by a
federal court in Colorado and affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court. Fullington v. Shea, 320 F. Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1970), aft'd, 404 U.S. 963 (1971). For further
discussion of the implications of this case, see pp. 503-04 infra.
9. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
10. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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that the task performed by the Democratic Party was governmental in nature.
The state had, in effect, delegated part of its public functions in conducting
the electoral process to a private organization. Therefore, for the purposes
of these elections, the Party stood in the shoes of the state and was bound
by the same constitutional restrictions as the state government itself.
In the decisions dealing with company towns-Marsh v. Alabama" and
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,1 2 the Court extended the
public-function principle to find state action in the streets of a companyowned town (Marsh) and a privately owned shopping center (Logan Valley).
Because of the public nature of these entities, the Court held that the private
entrepreneurs could not inhibit the exercise of free speech on their property.
The Court emphasized that the very openness of the areas in question invited
the expression of free speech which was protected in the surrounding publicly
owned area. The Court spoke in expansive terms in Marsh:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."3
These decisions dealt with first amendment rights to speech and assembly,
rights that are granted special protection by the Court. For this reason, the
lower federal courts have applied their reasoning to other situations infrequently, and have never used it in regard to rights not falling within the
4
context of the first amendment.'
In 1961, the Court crystallized a second principle whereby it found state
action in an entirely privately owned enterprise. The test of "weighing facts
and circumstances" was announced in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.' 5 In that case, a private restaurant leased space in a building owned
and operated by the parking authority, a government agency. The Court
held that the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment was met
and that the restaurant had violated the equal protection clause by excluding
black customers. The Court did not find state action by analyzing the nature

11. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
12. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).

13. 326 U.S. at 506.

14. In Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1973), the Supreme Court modified extensively the functional equivalent test in Marsh and limited Logan Valley to
its facts in upholding the property rights of the owner of a large enclosed shopping
mall over the first amendment rights of anti-war demonstrators. The court enhanced
the status of the "reasonable alternative" test established in a labor law case in modifying the applicability of the first amendment in the exercise of free speech on quasipublic property.

15. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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of the task performed by the restaurant to determine if it was governmental
in nature. Rather, it summarized the various contacts between the government and the restaurant and found them to be so numerous and so mutually
beneficial as to make the state a participant in the operation of the restaurant. Key facts which "added up" to the finding of state action were that
the restaurant's profits contributed to the success of the parking authority
through the lease arrangement; the building in which the restaurant was located was dedicated to public uses; and by locating in that building, the restaurant obtained certain tax exemptions.
The essence of the "facts and circumstances" test, as articulated by the
Court, is simply to weigh the totality of contacts between the state and the
private organization to determine whether they are sufficient to create state
involvement in the enterprise. The application of this principle requires
a case-by-case factual analysis which can be rather arbitrary. Minimal contacts will generally suffice where racial discrimination is alleged, while more
comprehensive contacts are required for other forms of discrimination or
inequitable treatment. Additional weight is given to those contacts that are
mutually beneficial to the parties.
The public function and the "facts and circumstances" principles were
both applied in Evans v. Newton. 16 In that case, black citizens had been
excluded from a privately owned and managed park. The park had originally been managed by the city as trustee under the will that created it. Only
when the city refused to enforce the segregation mandated by the will did the
private board of managers of the park transfer it to a private trustee. The
Court applied the Burton "facts and circumstances" test, summarizing the
various contacts between the park and the city-such as the city's past management and present maintenance of the park and the park's tax exemption
which, according to the Court, indicated government "entwinement" with the
park. In addition, the Court suggested that the private trustees were performing a public function, pointing to the "tradition" of government management, as well as the "public" character of the park itself. The Court cited
17
both Terry and Marsh.
Recently, federal courts have enunciated a third principle for determining
whether private parties are engaged in state action. In Lavoie v. Bigwood,' 8
16. 382 U.S. 296 (1966), ajj'd after remand sub nom., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435 (1970).
17. 382 U.S. at 299. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450
F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom., CBS v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973), where the court of appeals found a private television broadcaster to
be engaged in state action for some first amendment purposes (in this case, access
to paid advertising time). Citing both Marsh and Evans, the court applied a "functional considerations" test which looked to the government involvement in, or public
character of the enterprise.
18. 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972).
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the plaintiff alleged that the owner of a private trailer park had deprived him
of fourteenth amendment rights by evicting him for alleged involvement in a
tenant's association. The court addressed itself only to the question of
whether state action was present in the landlord's action. After a careful review of the company town cases and the line of decisions stemming from
Burton, the court found them inapplicable to the situation before it. Instead,
the court found state action present on the grounds that through its zoning
laws, "the government has. . . placed monopoly power in private hands in order to implement other purposes."' 19 While the purposes of the zoning laws
involved esthetic and tax considerations, their effect was so to reduce the
number of trailer sites in the area that the plaintiff had no suitable alternative
living site. It was the creation of partial or total monopoly power in private hands through government action that cloaked the defendant with state
action.
In the area of public utilities, the Lavoie case has been applied and cited
with approval by the eighth circuit. 20 In Jhrke v. Northern States Power
Co., 21 the court held that a private gas company which cut off service to its

customers acted "under color of state law" and could be held to the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The court reasoned that the company had gained either a partial or total monopoly over
the service area as a result of action taken by the local government. Further,
the city had the power to grant and revoke -franchises, take 5 % of the utility's profits, and review and revise the utility's regulations. The court found
22
that these involvements were sufficient to constitute state action.
The determination or finding of state action as a result of the state's endowing a private organization with monopoly power, enunciated in Lavoie
and Jhrke, has been thrown into question by the more recent Supreme Court
decision in Moose Lodge v. lrvis.23 There, the Court held that state action
was not present merely because a private club held a liquor license. The
black plaintiff who was denied access to the club argued that the granting of
a license amounted to state action and that the licensing was based on a quota
system, thereby restricting his access to other clubs, which would admit him.
Additionally, private clubs could serve liquor at hours when public restaur19. Id. at 13.
20. The Lavoie court cited AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), in support of its position. While the application of
these cases to the Lavoie situation can only be justified by a highly creative reasoning
process, this in no way demeans the court's reasoning in Lavoie itself.
21. 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972).
22. A second rationale in Ihrke was the performance by a private enterprise of a
public function.
23. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).

19741

Health Care

ants could not. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, specifically re24
jected this argument.
Little emphasis was placed in the Moose Lodge case on the state-supported
monopoly issue. Furthermore, at least one subsequent federal district court
decision has refused to apply the Moose Lodge decision to a public restaurant which denied access to women. Distinguishing Moose Lodge on the
fact that the club there was not open to the public, the district court in
Bennet v. Dyer's Chop House2 5 held that state action was present in the
defendant restaurant because of its liquor license, and therefore held that
exclusion of women from the premises violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.
These are the main legal threads through which state action can be traced
to a private enterprise. The same tests-performance of a public function
by a private entity; a broad range of contacts between the state and the entity (sufficient facts and circumstances); or the grant by the state of monopoly
status-must be applied to determine the extent to which private hospitals are
involved in state action. In the few decisions dealing with the issue, the first
two theories have been applied and the third would be highly appropriate.
In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,26 the fourth circuit found
state action in a private hospital because of the hospital's receipt of public
funds under the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (Hill-Burton
Act).27 Basically, this program creates a system of federal and state
grants for hospital construction and modernization in order to "furnish adequate hospital . . .services to all ...people."' 28 The funds are made available to private non-profit as well as public hospitals through a state planning
agency and an advisory council which submit applications to the United
States Public Health Service with recommendations for approval. The state
agency is charged with developing a comprehensive hospital building and
modernization plan which must be approved by the Public Health Service; all
applications must conform with the plan. Finally, the state must develop
minimum licensing standards for all its hospitals in order to qualify for assistance.
In Simkins, plaintiffs were black physicians, dentists, and patients who
were excluded from two private hospitals both of which had received Hill24. For an extensive treatment of the fourteenth amendment and court development
of the tests discussed here, see Basset, The Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REV.39 (1972).

25. 350 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
26. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).

27. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970).
28. Id.
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Burton funds. 29 The court held state action to be present by applying a Burton "facts and circumstances" test. In so holding, it summarized the contacts between the hospital on the one hand and the state and federal governments on the other. Particular emphasis was placed on licensing requirements, the need to conform to the state plan, and the receipt of government
funds.
The court went beyond a mere summary of contacts between the hospital
and the government to describe the mutual benefit to the state and defendant hospitals resulting from program participation. The state received better
health care and protection for its citizens while the hospital gained funds for
improved facilities. The Simkins court also noted the public nature of the
function performed by the hospital when it stated:
Upon joining the program, a particular State in effect assumes,
as a State function, the obligation of planning for adequate hospital care. And, it is, of course, clear that when a State function
or responsibility is exercised, it matters not for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes that the . . . [institution actually chosen]
would otherwise be private; the equal protection guarantee applies.3 0
While the above language was dictum, since the holding was based directly on a total contacts test, the fact that the principle of private performance of a public function was noted at all in the hospital context is significant.
This dictum gained added vitality in the court's subsequent decision in Eaton
v. Grubbs.31 Again, the claim was exclusionary practices against black physicians and patients by a private hospital and again the court found state action. But this time the hospital, while located in a participating Hill-Burton
state, had received no Hill-Burton funds. State action was predicated upon
the state's required promulgation of licensing regulations applying to all hospitals within its territory, as well as the fact that the hospital was initially
owned by the city, and although built with private funds, located on city
land. Upon the occurrence of certain events, a reverter clause would operate to return the hospital from private ownership to the city.
There is a remarkable similarity between the facts in Eaton and those in
the later Supreme Court case of Evans v. Newton. And, while the Eaton
court did not directly so state, there is strong basis for regarding the decision
29. Plaintiffs actually sought invalidation of the "separate but equal" provisions of
the federal act, Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 1946, ch. 958 § 622(f), 60
Stat. 1041 and regulations promulgated thereunder, formerly 42 C.F.R. § 53.112, which
the court did declare unconstitutional, but this was not relevant to its discussion of
state action.
30. 323 F.2d at 968. The court cited inter alia, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944), as support for its position.
31. 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
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as standing for the principle that the provision of hospital care in a HillBurton state has become a governmental function (much as the maintenance
and creation of parks in Evans) thereby subjecting all hospitals in the state to
fourteenth amendment requirements, regardless of whether they are the re3
cipients of federal funds.

2

Since the Simkins and Eaton decisions, federal courts both within and outside the fourth circuit have continued to find state action in private hospitals
located in Hill-Burton states.33 A Pennsylvania district court has stated that
the principle is now "well-established . . . that the receipt of Hill-Burton

funds carries with it the obligation to observe federal constitutional mandates."'3 4 One state court, the Hawaii Supreme Court, has also held a private
hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds to be imbued with state action,3 5 relying
on the governmental function theory of Marsh v. Alabama and Smith v. AllWright. No court has yet gone beyond or elaborated upon the Eaton finding
of state action in a hospital simply because it was located in a Hill-Burton
state.36
B.

Establishing Unlawful Discrimination

Although the case law strongly suggests that private hospitals, as well as
their public counterparts, meet state action requirements, any judicial challenge
based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment must also
demonstrate unlawful or unexcusable discrimination. In reaching such a determination, the Supreme Court has relied upon two different standards. The
first requires a finding that the state (or the entity involved in a state action)
has created a suspect classification that injures the group so classified, or
has interfered with the exercise of a fundamental right. Once the factual allegations are found to fit within one of these categories, the Court applies a
"compelling state interest" test whereby the state or defendant cloaked with
32. Id. at 713.
33. See Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969);
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Citta v.
Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Meredith v. Allen
County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). But see Mulvihill
v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), a case
which can be distinguished on its facts from the type of litigation (access to hospitals)
under discussion here.
34. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
35. Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., - Hawaii -, 497 P.2d 564 (1972).
36. For other cases finding state action in the operations of private hospitals, see
Manlove v. Wilmington General Hosp., 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18 (Super. Ct. Del.
1961), requiring a private hospital to provide emergency services because of its receipt
of a tax exemption and public subsidies; Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n,
413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969), involving a non-racial denial of physicians' hospital
privileges which the court found lacked a rational justification.
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state action must show, through its own proof, that the distinctions being
made by either the letter or operation of its laws are absolutely necessary to
the purposes of the law or practice in question. If such a showing cannot be
made, the challenged practice will be found to violate the equal protection
clause.
If, on the other hand, no suspect classification has been made and there
is no fundamental right present, the Court applies a "rational basis" test.
Under this test, wide latitude is granted to the states in the exercise of their police powers and it is only necessary to show some reasonable, but not necessarily the most direct, relationship between the alleged state purpose and the
means of effecting that purpose. Given the presence of a rational link, discrimination between definable classes of citizens will not be in violation of
the equal protection clause.
Most law review commentators seeking to establish a constitutional right
to -health care have based their case either on the establishment of a fundamental right to health care or on the demonstration that discrimination against
the poor in the delivery of health services constitutes a suspect classification,
or both.A7 Unfortunately, the decisions of neither the Warren nor the Burger
Court supports these high hopes.
The Court has enunciated very few categories of fundamental rights.
These are: the right to marriage and procreation,38 the right to vote,39 the
right to travel across state lines, 40 the right to equal access to the criminal
appellate process, 41 and the right to free speech. 42 Only one suspect classification has been defined, that of race. 43 An effort to establish an additional fundamental right, the right to education, was recently turned back by the Supreme Court. 44 The Court has similarly rejected arguments that there is a
fundamental right to housing or welfare because they are necessities of life
46
in Lindsey v. Normet 45 and Dandridge v. Williams.
37. See Comment, Indigent's Right to Sue a Private Hospital for Refusal to Admit
Him, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 292; and Note, Hospital Admissions and Equal Protection,
5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 502 (1972).

38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
39. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
40. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Morely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
43. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
I realize that alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), are thought by
some to constitute judicially recognized suspect classifications. However, I believe they
are more properly considered subsets of the racial classification.

44. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
45. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
46. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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The Court's decisions dealing with the right to welfare provide an interesting example of the difficulties of establishing a fundamental right. In a
number of decisions the Court referred to the essential nature of welfare. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, 47 for example, the Court spoke of welfare as being the
means by which qualified recipients obtain "essential food, clothing, housing,
and medical care,"' 48 referring to the importance of meeting the "basic demands of subsistence." But, in Dandridge v. Williams, 49 the Court refused
to hold welfare to be a fundamental right. In that case, the Court upheld a
Maryland law placing a limit on the amount of AFDC payments available to
a family regardless of its size. The Court applied a rational basis test and
pointed out that great deference must be given to the states' police power in
the areas of social and economic regulation, suggesting that the states have
greater leeway in these areas than in regard to basic political rights or rights
50
of free expression.
As already noted, one lower federal court has held in Fullington v. Shea
that state-drawn distinctions between the medically needy and those eligible
for categorical assistance under Medicaid do not violate the equal protection
clause.5 1 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention in that case
that health care was a fundamental right analogous to the right to food, shel52
ter, and necessities mentioned in the dictum in Shapiro v. Thompson.
Health care was deemed to be more analogous to the welfare area which the
the court found controlled by Dandridge. In applying the rational basis test,
the court found the state's action was valid as an attempt to avoid administrative uncertainty, insure fiscal control, and discourage its citizens from incurring excessive medical expenses. Perhaps the lower court's rather facile
analogy between the medically indigent and welfare recipients as well as the
Supreme Court's affirmance without opinion can be ascribed to the plaintiffs'
decision to frame the case within the context of the Medicaid statutes. The
equal protection claim was only secondary.
However, Fullington,combined with the Supreme Court decisions discussed
47. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
48. Id. at 264.
49. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
510.
Most recently, in Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), a federal statute
was upheld which denied social security benefits to the extent that one receives workman's compensation despite the fact that privately insured persons receive full benefits.
The Court specifically refused to extend the Goldberg analogy between welfare benefits
and a property right beyond the facts of that case.
51. See note 8 supra.

To similar effect is Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535

(1972), allowing differential treatment of OAA recipients (predominantly white), and
AFDC recipients (predominantly Black and Mexican-American) by the State of Texas.
Although Jefferson was decided on federal statutory grounds, the court cited Dandridge
as being controlling as to what test would be applied in the area of welfare.
52. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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above, suggests that the fundamental right and suspect classification route to
health care litigation is not a promising one.
Nor is it likely that the treatment of the poor in regard to health facilities
will be held to be a suspect classification. Much has been said of certain
dicta in Warren Court decisions that seemed to treat wealth as a suspect classification in much the same manner that race is treated. For example in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,53 the Court said: "[lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race . . . are traditionally dis-

favored." Again in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, Chief
Justice Warren wrote:
[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race . . . two

factors which would independently render a classification highly
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.54
The problem with these statements is that they are simply dicta. Harper
was decided on the basis of the fundamental right to vote while a rational basis
test in McDonald found no violation of equal protection guarantees.
Similar difficulties exist with the criminal appeals cases which have invariably found discrimination based on indigency. These cases include appealing language referring to arbitrary classifications on the basis of wealth,
but in the final analysis, the decisions turn on the plaintiffs' fundamental
right to liberty which can only be protected by equal access to the appellate
process. Perhaps, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his articulate dissent in
Griffin v. Illinois,55 much of this language grows out of the Court's decision
to approach the entire problem on equal protection instead of due process
grounds, rather than reflecting a growing receptivity to wealth as a suspect
classsification.
In summary, no case has ever held a law invalid solely because of its differential impact on the poor. Nor is the reconstituted Supreme Court likely
so to hold. The Court has already made clear its reluctance to impose such
broad equalizing obligations on government in the Rodriguez decision., 6
This means that if the equal protection clause is to be the basis for a suit, a
narrower ground for decision must be presented. Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest such a ground may eventually lie in the "rational basis" test.
A recent law review commentary points out that in at least seven decisions
during the last term, the Burger Court found a violation of equal protection
53.
54.
55.
56.
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U.S. at 668.
U.S. at 807.
U.S. 12, 36-39 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973.).
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without reference to fundamental rights or suspect classifications. 57 These decisions did not focus on the validity of the purpose for which the state action
was designed but rather on the effectiveness or rationality of the means by
which the state sought to fulfill its purpose. This approach is particularly
appropriate for the proposed challenges to the distribution or accessibility of
hospital care, because state statutes and constitutional provisions dealing with
health care often disclose or imply a purpose to provide quality health care
to all citizens, but fail to provide adequate means to achieve that purpose.
For example, in James v. Strange,58 the court held unconstitutional Kansas statutes providing certain creditors with broader powers than other creditors to recoup legal defense fees expended for indigent defendants. Without
reaching the broad constitutional questions of wealth discrimination and unequal access to a fair criminal trial on which the court below based its decision, 59 the Court held that Kansas' distinction between the plaintiffs' class and
other civil debtors was without rationality and, therefore, failed to satisfy equal
protection requirements. The decision turned not on whether the purpose
of the Kansas laws offended the constitution but on the means by which the
state sought to achieve what was conceded, arguendo, to be a valid purpose.
The Court's search for some rational basis was not so far reaching as it
might have been, thereby throwing into question the old truism that the Court
could always find some rational link between purpose and nMeans. The tendency to reduce sharply the search for a rational basis was 6ven more obvious in Reed v. Reed,°0 where the Court struck down an Idaho probate statute
which gave men mandatory preference over women in applying for appointment to administer an estate. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
found it unnecessary to decide whether sex discrimination constituted a suspect classification since there was no rational basis for excluding women from
estate management.
Most significant for the purposes of this discussion is Eisenstadt v. Baird,6'
which invalidated Massachusetts's ban on the distribution of contraceptives to
married persons, except by prescription. The court found that the valid interest of the state in controlling the health of its citizens was not rationally
served by the statute since it did not distinguish between potentially dangerous contraceptives and harmless ones. The Baird decision reflects a new ap57. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine and a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L

REv. 1, 18 (1972).
58. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
59. Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971).
60. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
61. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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proach to the rational basis test, focusing on whether the state is using the best
means to achieve its objective rather than on whether there is any justification
for the means employed. From another view, as the dissent in Baird pointed
out, a rational basis could be imagined in the state's desire to insure professional advice concerning the effectiveness of contraceptives.
Furthermore, Baird represents a shift in the deference granted to states in
the area of health regulation. In the 1955 decision in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,6 2 the Court had upheld a state law prohibiting opticians from placing
old lenses in new frames without a prescription from a licensed physician on
the ground that prescriptions might conceivably be needed in some instances.
A major basis of the decision was the need to respect the state's expertise in
regulating health methods. The mystique of such assumed expertise is clearly
63
eroded by Eisenstadtv. Baird.
These decisions unquestionably suggest broader reliance on the rational
basis test, holding out the possibility that the Court will impose increasingly
strict standards on state legislatures. However, they provide only limited
cause for optimism. Each one involved a restricted factual situation representing isolated abuses. On the other hand, when the Court was called upon in
the Rodriguez case to find an entire state system irrational (the Texas system
for financing public schools), it refused to do so even though a strong case to
that effect had been made. All that can be said at present, is that if the
Court continues to expand the concept, it is not inconceivable that it could
eventually serve as the basis for overthrowing state health system legislation.
Such an evolution would require several years at a minimum.
The following constitutes a review of the laws of three states pertaining
to the regulation and administration of hospitals. This analysis establishes
broad "state action" in regard to the operation of private hospitals. It strongly
suggests that should health care be elevated to a fundamental right or its denial to the poor be established as a suspect classification, "state action" would
be found in the operation of private hospitals and any denial on their part
of equal access to services-or equal services-would be barred by the
fourteeenth amendment. It also suggests, but to a lesser degree, that in those
states with far-reaching statutory commitments to a general system of hospital
care, but with gross disparities or deficiencies in the actual delivery of such a
care, an argument can be developed to the effect that these states are violating
the "rational basis" test discussed above. The latter point is dependent upon
the Court's adopting the position that private hospitals are part of a total
public delivery system.
62.
63.

348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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The Hospital Statutes-State Action and Equal Protection
The most salient fact emerging from an examination of statutory law in
California, Michigan and New Jersey 64 is that the states' contacts with
the hospitals within their borders, both public and private, are extensive,
reaching far beyond the Hill-Burton contacts that formed the basis of
the findings in the Simkins and Eaton cases and in Sams v. Ohio Valley
General Hospital Association.6 5
Besides being Hill-Burton participants, all three states are participants
in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, whereby funds are provided to
certain private hospitals as compensation for treatment provided to qualified recipients. Participation in all of these federal aid programs brings
substantial "mutual benefit" to both the state and private hospitals.
California has the most highly developed, centralized statutory system
for the regulation, financing, and planning of hosptials. For this reason
that state's statutory health system is described in detail, followed by
summaries of the other two states. Before beginning, we should note that
the word "system" as used here is both conclusory and misleading. The
"system" under consideration is rather ramshackle in the sense that many
unrelated and originally uncoordinated pieces of legislation comprise its
component parts. Yet, when the end result is seen in the context of judicial pronouncements, such as those noted in Burton, Evans and Lavoie,
it is not unfair to describe at least the California statutory scheme as a
"system" in the sense that the state has become so involved in the development and operation of its hospitals that traditional public-private
divisions based on mere legal ownership have become meaningless.
One obvious intervention by the state in the operation of private institutions, noted also in Burton, is the granting of a tax exemption. All
three states provide tax exemptions for private, non-profit hospitals, but
66
Califorin California, this provision is elevated to constitutional status.
nia also has a hospital licensing statute which, as stated above, is a prerequisite to Hill-Burton participation. In fact, the state's licensing statute, which
applies to all hospitals, was originally enacted in 1925, long before it was
needed for the receipt of federal funds. The entire licensing procedure
is administered by the State Department of Public Health, an agency whose
creation is mandated by the constitution, 67 and which is responsible for
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1250 et seq. (West Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT.
§ 30:4D-1 et seq. (Cumulative Supp. 1973); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 16.490(15)
et seq. (Cumulative Supp. 1968).

64.

ANN.

65. 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969).
66. CAL. COINsT. art. XIII, § IC.
67. CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, § 14. See 26 Op. CAL. Ar'y GEN. 7 (1955), which declares that the constitutional mandate results from the importance of the department's
work.
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promulgating regulations under the statute as well as ensuring compliance by individual hospitals. As in Michigan and New Jersey, California
law makes it a crime to operate an unlicensed hospital, again indicating
the state's vital interest in protecting its citizens' health.
An important recent amendment to the licensing act states that all hospitals must provide emergency room treatment to all persons "in danger
of loss of life, or serious injury or illness"6 8 regardless of their ability to
pay. This is a substantial limitation on the discretion of private hospitals
to accept or reject patients.
California's licensing act is coordinated with its Hill-Burton program, 69
as well as the Health Facility Construction and Loan Insurance Law of 1969,70
and the Health Planning Act of 1967.71 All of these programs fall under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Health. In carrying out its responsibility, the department is assisted by a state Advisory Health Council.
The 1969 loan act provides a system of state guarantees for loans to
public and private nonprofit hospitals engaged in new construction, expansion, or modernization. The purpose of the act is "to rationally meet
the need for new, expanded and modernized public and nonprofit health
'72
facilities necessary to protect the health of all the people of this state."
Voluntary local health planning agencies, financed by the Department
of Public Health are empowered to review individual proposals for new
or additional health facilities. Among other responsibilities, these agencies have the authority to grant "certificates of need" to hospitals seeking
78
permission to construct new or additional facilities.
Approval by the local planning agency is also a prerequisite to the
granting of a license by the department and, in effect, constitutes a grant
by the state of a monopoly to a private entity to the same extent as the
zoning laws described in Lavoie.
The Advisory Health Council assists the local agencies by developing general planning guidelines. It is also charged with advising the Department
of Public Health concerning the granting of insurance for loans under the
68. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1345 (West 1973).
69. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 430 et seq. (West 1970).
70. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 436 et seq. (West 1970).
71. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 437 et seq. (West 1970).
72. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 436.1 (West 1970).
73. The determination of whether to grant such a certificate must be based on the
following criteria: (1) the need for health facilities in the area; (2) the availability
and adequacy of existing facilities; (3) the availability of existing alternatives to the
proposed facility; (4) the economies to be derived from joint or cooperative health care
resources; and (5) "the development of comprehensive services for the community to
be served."
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loan act. Thus, the construction or expansion of all hospitals, as well
as the government's financing of construction and expansion of public and
private nonprofit hospitals, is highly controlled by the Department of Public
Health in consultation with the Advisory Health Council. This control is
designed to create a rational system for the provision of health care to all
citizens in the context of a single state plan which, while originally developed for Hill-Burton purposes, now extends far beyond the contemplations
of that act.
California's planning and regulatory scheme for all hospitals is supplemented by special statutes dealing exclusively with the needs of indigents.
Long before any of the laws described above were enacted, California,
like the other two states under consideration, had begun to develop a system of local public hospitals to care for the indigent sick. 74 This system
was discretionary in that creation of a local public hospital was left to the
determination of county boards of supervisors. 7 Recent state court decisions indicate that once such a county hospital is established, it must serve
all indigent residents of the county. 76 Moreover, a recent amendment to the
County Medical Facilities Act requires all county hospitals to treat indigents
regardless of their county of residence. 77 This trend toward state-wide coordination of care for indigents also involves private hospitals; a 1971 enactment authorizes the county board of supervisors to contract with private
sources for the treatment of indigents in order to coordinate the provision of hospital care more efficiently.
The Local Hospital District Law of 1945,78 provides another link in the
chain of state coordinated provisions of hospital care. Under this law,
the majority of the citizens within one or more counties may vote to designate themselves a hospital district. Such a district is incorporated, has the
power to issue bonds, and can set rates for treatment for public hospitals
within its jurisdiction as well as for those private hospitals with which it
contracts for services. 79 The basic purpose of a district is to more efficiently coordinate the local provision of publicly financed hospital care.80
The creation of districts is now coordinated with the overall state plan
since the local area health planning agency must certify that a proposed
74.

See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1440 et seq.

(West

1970) entitled County

Medical Facilities and originally enacted in 1929.
75. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1445 (West 1970).
76. See, e.g., County of San Diego v. Viloria, 276 Cal. App. 2d 350, 80 Cal. Rptr.

869 (1969).
77. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1447 (West 1970).
78. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 32000 et seq. (West 1973).
79. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 32121 (West 1973).
80. See Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal. 2d 33, 257 P.2d

22 (1953).
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district would not be contrary to the state's Hill-Burton plan before the
vote to create a district can be held.
Finally, under the Hospital Disclosure Act of 1971,81 all hospitals in the
state are required to file public reports of their cost experience in the provision of health care services so that public and private third-party payers
for health services may more accurately determine reimbursement rates
for services rendered.
The hospital laws of Michigan and New Jersey contain many provisions similar to those of California, but the degree of centralization created in California by links between the separate acts is lacking. For example, New Jersey coordinates the Hill-Burton planning and programming,
the issuance of certificates of need, and some of its licensing activities
under a single Health Care Facilities Act of 1971,82 administered by the state
Department of Health, but the state has no provision for state-insured loans to
finance hospital construction or expansion. Furthermore, while the construction of county and city hospitals must be approved by the state Department of Health, 88 localities without public hospital facilities may contract for provision of care to indigents by private sources within certain fi84
nancial limits without any state approval or control.
The trend in New Jersey is toward increased centralization. The State
Health Aid Act of 196685 provides state grants to counties and municipalities
which have contracted with private sources for the delivery of health
care. The grant program is administered by the Department of Health.
However, the program is geared more toward environmental and medical research grants than grants to offset a locality's payment to a private
hospital for the care of the indigent. 88
7
Michigan, on the other hand, has a Hospital Finance Authority Act
substantially similar to the California Health Facilitity Construction Loan
Insurance Law, but the administration of the act is delegated to the state
Department of the Treasury. The state's Licensing Act88 is administered
by the state Director of Public Health while its Hill-Burton program89
is administered by a separate state Health Commissioner who is charged
with advising and consulting with the Department of Public Health in carryCAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 440 et seq. (West Supp. 1974).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-1 et seq. (Cumulative Supp. 1973).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:9-12-1 (1964).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:5-2 et seq. (Cumulative Supp. 1973).
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2F-1 et seq. (Cumulative Supp. 1973).
86. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2F-4 (Cumulative Supp. 1973).
87. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.1220 et seq. (1960).
88. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.1179 et seq. (1960).
89. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.1216 et seq. (1960).

81.
82.
83.
84.
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ing out his duties. Finally, the Michigan provisions for county hospitals,90 originally enacted in 1909, are not coordinated in any meaningful
way, other than through Hill-Burton funding, with hospital planning at the
state level. And, Michigan has no certificate-of-need legislation.
Nevertheless, the statutes of both Michigan and New Jersey contain statements of purpose, not to be found in California statutes, which could
prove helpful to the type of litigation under consideration. For example,
in the legislation establishing the State Department of Health, New Jersey has
declared that it has a "growing problem of prevention, detection and care of
chronic illness

. . .

and it is

. .

.the public policy of this State that the re-

sponsibility therefor must be shared by the State and the counties and the
several municipalities . . . within the State and the public at large." 91

The state Health Act of 1966 declares it to be "the public policy of this
State to ensure that public health services are provided, protecting all citi92
zens and visitors within this State."1
The Michigan licensing statute states that its purpose is "to protect the
public

. . .

through the assurance that hospitals provide the facilities and the

ancillary supporting services necessary to enable a high quality of patient
care." 93 The Michigan Hospital Finance Authority Act is "for the benefit
of the people of the state and the improvement of their health. '9 4 Finally,
the Michigan Hill-Burton Act is designed for the purpose of affording
"hospitals adequate to serve all the people of the state." 95
These statutory statements of purpose-as well as the implied purpose
inherent in California's overall statutory scheme--could be highly relevant to an equal protection challenge to the discriminatory delivery of
health services under the revitalized rational basis test utilized by the Supreme Court in its decisions of the last term, provided, of course, that
the Court is willing to apply the test to systemic, as well as isolated problems. As will be recalled, under this test a violation of equal protection is
predicated on a state's failure to carry out the purposes of its legislation
in the best possible way. If a state's hospital legislation can be read to
say either literally or by implication, that its purpose is to provide quality
medical care to all citizens, through a publicly controlled system that relies
on both privately and publicly administered facilities, then proof that the
system provides substantially less or inferior care to the indigent--or to
90. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.1121 et seq. (1960).
91. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26: 1A-93 (1964).
92. N.J. STAT. AiiN. § 26:2F-2 (Cumulative Supp. 1973).
93. MicH. STAT. ANN.§ 14.1179(1) (1%0).
94. MicH.STAT. ANN. § 14.1220(2) (1960).

95. Mii.STAT. ANN. § 14.1200 (1960).
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other definable segments of the population-could well constitute a violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.9"
Underpinning such a rational basis challenge would be a showing that
the provision of hospital care, whether by a public or private facility, is
state action because such care has become a public function. We have already shown that support for this premise can be found in the state's
centralized scheme for financing and controlling the development of both
private and public hospitals. So far, the argument would be similar to the
Simkins and Evans dicta that private parties may come to perform a public
function through legislative enactments. The arguments would continue as the
Lavoie court did, to show that legislative enactments which restrict the total
number of hospitals, including privately owned facilities (e.g., hospital
licensing, bonding and certificate-of-need legislation) in effect endow such
facilities with monopolistic characteristics that constitute state action in
themselves.
If a showing could be made that the state system that promises adequate care to all is in fact effected through statutes and actual practices
that deny access to in-patient hospital care to poor citizens or that provide inferior treatment to the poor, plaintiffs would be in a good position
to request an order compelling the state legislature to enact a statutory
scheme that would insure the equitable, rational distribution of resources
in accordance with state statutory or constitutional purposes. If such legislation already existed, the litigation would be directed to the executive to
insure full implementation of the law."7
The possibility of a successful equal protection challenge is presently rather
remote. 98 The decisions of the last term, although promising, all dealt with
limited situations. The Rodriguez case, on the other hand, presented the
Supreme Court with a challenge to a total scheme for financing the public
schools. In that situation, despite a number of highly irrational characteristics
in the Texas school finance formula, the Court was unwilling to compel a
rewrite of the entire system. It reverted to its former approach of accepting
any justification as a rational basis. This reluctance suggests that, at least un96. In Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969),

the "rational basis" test was applied to a hospital's regulations concerning physician
privileges. The court found an unlawful discrimination where the denial of privileges
was based solely on the geographic location of the doctors' practices.
97. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), which

found a violation of equal protection when a municipality provided inferior services
to its black citizens. This case is, of course, a "race" case and of little precedential
value in dealing with questions of poverty.
98. Challenges to the administration of state and federal welfare provisions have
proceeded in this manner. A broad series of statutory rights were articulated before
the more recent (unsuccessful) equal protection challenges were pressed,
...
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til the rational basis test has been further refined, it will be impossible to
get the courts to take on a system-wide challenge to the delivery of health
services, where the system is a far less clearly articulated one than those
controlling the financing of public schools.
The school finance decision and the other recent decisions of the Supreme
Court in refusing to extend the reach of the equal protection clause to situations involving discrimination in the delivery of services to the poor,
lead to the conclusion that for the time being, legal challenges seeking
to achieve more equitable distribution of health resources should not be
based on a fourteenth amendment challenge to the entire state-wide scheme
for providing health care. The history of the school finance reform
movement suggests that in an area such as health where there has been
little litigation and therefore limited definition of individual rights, it is
more circumspect to develop a litigation strategy that builds on a step-bystep basis a series of legal principles that can eventually be interrelated to
support a broad constitutional challenge to systemic inequities.
Following the debacle in Rodriguez, school litigators are suggesting that
in retrospect, it would have been preferable first to establish such principles as: the requirement of the public schools to provide an education to
all students, including those with handicaps and language barriers; the
obligation of the schools to provide students with the basic tools of
learning such as textbooks and writing materials; and the right of students
to receive an education that meets state mandated minimum requirements,
such as minimum attendance requirements. According to this line of
thinking, basic rights should first be carved out from statutory requirements. For example, if there is a requirement for universal mandatory
education, that necessarily includes Spanish-speaking students or those with
handicaps; if the state defines the school year as including a specific number of days, all students are entitled to attend school for the same term,
even those residing in financially pressed districts. Only after those rights
have been articulated should comparative denials based on constitutional
mandates be challenged.
This analogy suggests that at this time, litigation seeking a more equitable distribution of health resources should be based on specific state statutory provisions and the failure of local administrators, both public and
private, to adhere to them, rather than attempting a broad constitutional
challenge. Among the kinds of lawsuits that would be appropriate are the
following: in states where the legislation purports to insure service to all a
lawsuit on behalf of poor plaintiffs residing in an area that receives no, or
only incomplete, service would be appropriate to compel the state to ful-
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fill its commitment; in a state that participates in the Hill-Burton program
but that has failed to implement the 1970 amendments requiring priority
attention to poor areas, a suit could be initiated to compel such an allocation of resources; similarly if the Hill-Burton or comprehensive health plan
represents that areas of need will be served, but in fact the plan is not implemented, a suit to compel adherence to the terms of the plan would be appropriate; certification-of-need laws can also be used to prevent the construction of facilities in service-rich areas and to stimulate such construction in deprived areas; in states that give local governments the authority to
contract with private hospitals for services to the poor, such contracts
could form the basis of a third-party beneficiary suit where the private
hospitals are not meeting their obligations sufficiently.
In short, lawsuits addressed to specific deprivations, rather than systemic failures, should be based on the kinds of constitutional and statutory
provisions now in effect in California, New Jersey and Michigan. These
suits will have the effect not only of defining and compelling performance
of the state's responsibility, but also of enunciating legal concepts that can
form the basis of subsequent challenges.

